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Moeller: Moeller: Civil Rights-Reverse Discrimination

RECENT CASES
CIVIL RIGHTS-REVERSE DISCRIMINATIONTITLE VII AND SECTION 1981
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail TransportationCo.'
Petitioners L.N. McDonald and Raymond L. Laird, white employees,
were jointly and severally indicted with Charles Jackson, a black fellowemployee, for the misappropriation of sixty one-gallon containers of antifreeze from their employer, Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (Santa Fe).
Petitioners were discharged by Santa Fe six days later, but Jackson was
retained. Grievances alleging racial discrimination by Santa Fe were
promptly filed by petitioners with Local 988 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 988). When these grievance proceedings failed to
satisfy petitioners, they filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Petitioners alleged that Santa Fe had violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 by discriminating against them on
the basis of their race by discharging them, and that Local 988 had likewise
violated Title VII by failing to properly represent petitioner McDonald's
interests in the grievance proceedings. The EEOC proceedings proved to be
equally unavailing for petitioners, who consequently initiated a civil action
against Santa Fe and Local 988 in district court,3 alleging violations of Title
VII and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.4 The district court held
1. -

U.S. -,

96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) is the relevant provision, and states in part:
(a) Employerpractices. It should be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer. . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Labor organizationpractices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization ... to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975) gives an individual aggrieved
under Title VII the right to commence a civil action against one who has discriminated against him, provided certain prerequisite conditions are met. For an excellent
discussion of the procedures involved, see Kaemmerer, JurisdictionalPrerequisitesto
Private Actions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 Mo. L. REV. 215
(1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The statute provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
100
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that "the dismissal of white employees charged with misappropriating
company property while not dismissing a similarly charged Negro employee
does not raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be granted."' The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal per curiam, 6 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 In reversing the lower
courts, the Supreme Court held that "Tide VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as
would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson white."8 The Court
relied on language in its previous decision in Griggsv. Duke PowerCo.,9 where
it had considered the legality under Tide VII of the use of employment tests
which had the effect of racially discriminating against black job applicants.
In interpreting Title VII in that case, the Court had stated that
"[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."'" The Court followed Griggs
in another respect by giving great weight to the administrative interpretations given to Tide VII by the EEOC." In the past, the EEOC had
consistently interpreted Title VII as affording protection to whites.' 2 This
consistent administrative interpretation, combined with ample legislative
history indicating identical Congressional intent,13 furnished the McDonald
Court with compelling support for its decision.
The McDonald decision is significant in that it authoritatively settles the
question of whether whites, aggrieved because of racial discrimination in
employment situations, may state claims under Tide VII' 4 That such a
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
5. 96 S. Ct. at 2577.
6. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.
1975).
7. 423 U.S. 923 (1975).
8. 96 S.Ct. at 2578.
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10. Id. at 431.
11. 96 S.Ct. at 2578.
12. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 75-268, 10 FEP Cases 1502, CCH EEOC DEC.
6452 (1975); EEOC Decision No. 74-106, 10 FEP Cases 701, CCH EEOC DEC.
6427 (1974); EEOC Decision No. 74-95, 8 FEP Cases 701, CCH EEOC DEC. 6432
(1974); EEOC Decision No. 74-33, 7 FEP Cases 1326, CCH EEOC DEC. 6406
(1973); EEOC Decision No. 71-969, 3 FEP Cases 269, CCH EEOC DEC. 6193
(1970).
13. See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); Id. at
7213 (interpretative memorandum of Senators Clark and Case); Id. at 8921 (remarks
of Senator Williams).
14. The Supreme Court noted that only district courts had confronted Le
issue. 96 S.Ct. at 2578, n.7. Some of these courts reached contradictory results. See
notes 16-23 and accompanying text infra. One court of appeals has mentioned the
issue, stating that Tide VII "creates no rights or benefits in favor of non-minority
persons or groups .... Indeed,. . . white workers have successfully sought relief

for themselves under other statutes." Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers'
Union, 514 F.2d 767,773 (2d Cir. 1975).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/10
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question should have arisen in the first place is anamolous in view of the
language of Title VII, the past decisions of the Supreme Court, the administrative interpretations of the EEOC, and the expansive reading given to
other civil rights legislation by the courts.' 5 Nevertheless, various courts have
interpreted Title VII as not protecting whites. For example, in Mdle v. United
States Department of Justice,16 a white plaintiff challenged the use of unvalidated 17 employment tests with dual scoring systems for blacks and whites as
discriminating against him on the basis of his race.' 8 The court concluded
that while the use of unvalidated tests was in fact discriminatory per se, a
white plaintiff could not challenge that discrimination under Title VII. A
similar situation occurred in Haber v. Klassen,19 where a white Postal Service
employee alleged that a position which he sought, and for which he was
qualified, was denied him solely because of his race. Relying upon dicta from
Griggs2" and McDonnell-Douglas v. Green,2 1 the court in Haber concluded
flatly that "[m]embers of the white race may not seek relief for racial
discrimination under Title VII. ....
,,22 Other courts have expressed similar
attitudes with respect to whites seeking relief under Title VII, 2s and have on

occasion denied Title VII relief to white plaintiffs on other grounds even
15. See discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Runyon v. McCrary, - U.S. -, 96 S.
Ct. 2586, 2593-99 (1976).
16. 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed, 532 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1976), noted in 14 DuQ. L. REv. 269 (1976).
17. A "validated" test is one for which empirical data has been obtained
"demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which
candidates are being evaluated." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975).
18. The test in question should have been validated, according to the decree
which mandated its use. United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 364 F. Supp.
808, 831 (D.N.J. 1973). Since then, however, the use of both quotas and a validated
test has been prohibited. EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d
Cir. 1976). On the question of employment testing, see Wallace, Validity of Standardized Employment Testing Under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 37 Mo. L.
REV. 693 (1972).

19. 10 FEP Cases 1446, 10 EPD 10,387 (N.D. Ohio 1975), rev'dpercuriam,540
F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976). (Court of appeals reversed on authority of McDonald).
20. In Griggs, the Court had stated that the objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that. . . favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees." 401 U.S. at 429-30. The Habercourt concluded from this language that
only minorities were protected by Title VII, evidently overlooking another passage
in Griggs where the Supreme Court had declared that "[d]iscriminatory preference
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed." Id. at 431.
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In defining a prima facie case underTitle VII, Justice
Powell noted "[t]he complainant. . . must carry the initial burden. . . of establishing. . .(i) that he belongs to a racialminority. . . ." Id. at 802 (emphasis added).

22. 10 FEP Cases 1446, 1447; 10 EPD 10,387, p. 5649.
23. In NOWv. Bank of California, 6 FEP Cases 26, 5 EPD $ 8510 (N.D. Cal.
1973), the court stated of a white male plaintiff, "Phillips complains of discrimination
not against himself but against another and he does not come within the scope of protections
under the act." Id. at 27, 5 EPD at 7331 (emphasis added).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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when their protection by the statute had been acknowledged.24 Such constructions and misapplications of Title VII are not only contrary to the intent
of Congress, but are also potentially problematic to the extent that they
might serve as precedential basis for further restriction of the availability of
Title VII relief to whites or other groups. 5 In McDonaldthe Court carefully
foreclosed these possibilities by clearly articulating the principle that whites
are protected by Title VII.
The McDonald decision is significant in another major respect
because it also held that whites may state a cause of action for racial
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1870.26 This decision resolved
an area of considerable conflict in the law because in the past some courts
had been willing to extend section 1981 relief to whites27 and others had
not.2 8 Courts in the latter category denied relief to white plaintiffs because
the language in the statute granted to". . persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States the. . . full and equal benefit of all laws. . . as is enjoyed by

white citizens."29 These courts had determined that this language facially
limited the application of section 1981 to non-whites, an argument that was
offered by respondents in McDonald. The Court rejected that argument,
declaring that the statutory language "as is enjoyed by white persons" was
merely descriptive of the racial character of the rights protected. 0 An
intensive examination of the legislative history of the statute ultimately led
the Court to conclude that section 1981 was intended to protect both whites
and non-whites.31 But by deciding the section 1981 and Title VII issues
presented by McDonald, the Court raised more inquiries than it resolved.
The McDonald decision naturally raises the question of the extent to
which previous Title VII decisions may now be available to white plaintiffs
who wish to assert Title VII claims. The Supreme Court offered some
24. See discussion of the concept of standing as applied by courts to white
plaintiffs in notes 42 to 46 and accompanying text infra.
25. See Note, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 269, 275 (1976).
26. The Court had previously held that blacks could state a cause of action
under § 1981 for racial discrimination in the private employment area. Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
27. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972); Hollander v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975); WRMA Broadcasting v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
28. Balc v. United Steelworkers, 6 FEP Cases 824,6 EPD 8948 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
affirmed, 503 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1974); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205
(N.D. Ala. 1973); Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md. 1960).
29. 42 USC § 1981 (1970) (emphasis added).
30. See also Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90,94 (D. Conn.
1975) (rights enjoyed by whites are used as a measuring stick under § 1981).
31. But see Runyan v. McCrary, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting), where it was argued that due to codification errors in the United States
Code, the majority's reliance upon the legislative history of section 1981 is misplaced.
The statute, it was argued, was enacted pursuant to the fourteenth and not the
thirteenth amendment; hence, the dissent asserted, private action may not be
reached with section 1981.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/10
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guidance in resolving this issue by the manner in which it disposed of the
discrimination claims presented in the McDonald case. After determining
that white petitioners may state a claim under Title VII, the Court considered the merits of the petitioners' claims by principal reliance on the Court's
prior Title VII decision in McDonnell-Douglas.3 2 The respondent in McDonnell-Douglas, fired as part of a work force reduction in his employer's plant,
had been refused subsequent re-employment when the employer later
proceeded to fill positions for which respondent had been qualified.
Respondent's application for re-employment was denied on the basis of his
alleged prior participation in illegal and disruptive civil rights activities
against his employer. Aware of the possibility that this otherwise sufficient
justification was merely pretextual, the Supreme Court noted that the
"[p]etitioner may justifiably refuse to hire one who has engaged in unlawful,
disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members
of all races."3 3 Because the arguably pretextual use of criminal activity
against the employer was present as an employment criterion in both
McDonnell-Douglasand McDonald, the Court concluded the two cases were
indistinguishable, and applied the McDonnell-Douglas rule to McDonald.
Given this heavy reliance on a previous Title VII decision, 34 it is reasonable
to argue that other Titie VII decisions should be available to white plaintiffs
seeking Title VII relief. Thus armed with complete Title VII protection,
white plaintiffs might reasonably be expected to challenge several different
types of employment discrimination.
One form of discrimination which a white plaintiff might challenge
under McDonaldand Title VII is the type which Title VII was most clearly
intended to remedy: intentional or overt discrimination. This situation is
illustrated by Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.,' 5 in which white plaintiffs alleging
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin, were held to
state a cause of action under Title VII against their Japanese employer.
However, intentional discrimination need not be present for a hiring
practice to be actionable under Title VII. The Supreme Court has so held,
stating that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
32. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
33. Id. at 804.
34. In ruling on the petitioners' Title VII claim the McDonald Court need not
have addressed the substantive discrimination issues in the case. Rather, after ruling
that whites were protected by Title VII, the Court could have applied the "prima
facie case" outlined in its McDonnell-Douglasdecision and remanded on the basis that
petitioners' case met that test. See McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-3
(1973).
35. 408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex. 1976). It is interesting to note that this case was
decided by the same court that decided McDonald at the trial level. The Speiss case
was decided after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDonald, but before it
decided it. While the bulk of the opinion interpreted plaintiff's section 1981 claim,
the court sustained plaintiff's Title VII claim with minimal discussion.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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capability.""6 Because of the McDonald ruling, whites invoking this principle
should be able to challenge far more subtle forms of discriminatory action.
A second area in which white plaintiffs may assert Title VII claims
involves facially non-discriminatory employment practices. Many such employment practices have the effect of illegally discriminating against
minorities.17 Under McDonald and Griggsan aggrieved white job applicant
or employee asserting a Title VII claim should be able to challenge an
employment practice that resulted in the same discrimination against
whites. 38 For example, if a white employee was discharged because he was
convicted of selling marijuana, he should have a cause of action under Title
VII if the rule responsible for his discharge was not "job-related" under
Griggsand operated in a discriminatory fashion by eliminating disproportionally greater percentages of whites than minorities from the employer's
work force.3 9 Also, it should be possible for whites to challenge the use of
unvalidated employment tests as a hiring practice. 40 In addition, whites
should be able to challenge recruitment procedures where, for example, an
employer with a predominantly black work force relies primarily on wordof-mouth advertising of job vacancies to procure applicants. 41 But even
assuming that Title VII under the McDonald decisions provides relief in
these situations, there is no reason to conclude that Title VII will be used by
whites only to oppose the expansion of opportunities for minorities.
A third area in which whites may assert Title VII claims is illustrated by
the situation where a white plaintiff sues on behalf of minority group
members, challenging discrimination against that group. While employment opportunity for minorities might thus be expanded, an overly restrictive concept of "standing" usually prevents the successful assertion of such
36. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). This principle,
originally applicable to minorities, should be equally applicable to majority group
members under McDonald.
37. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (discharge for
multiple garnishments); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (validation of two-Part employment
test insufficient); Gregory v. Litton Systems, 36 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusal to hire if more than minimum number of traffic
arrests). On legality of garnishments rules, see Jeter, Civil Rights---Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964-DismissalfromEmployment of Minority-GroupsfEmployeeforExcessive
Wage Garnishment, 37 Mo. L. REv. 705 (1972).
38. Affirmative action programs will not be considered here; see notes 47-71
and accompanying text infra.
39. EEOC Decision 75-269, CCH EEOC DEC. 6453 (1975).
40. Mele v. United States, Dept. of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975),
appeal dismissed, 532 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1976). According to the court, all that
prevented the plaintiff from stating a claim was his lack of protection by Title VII. Of
course, McDonald has now altered that.
41. See Parkam v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
In this case the company had no affirmative action programs and gained employees
from word-of-mouth advertising. The work force was predominantly white, employing 51 blacks out of 2,736 total employees.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/10
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claims. In Ripp v. Dobbs Houses,42 for example, a white plaintiff sought Title
VII relief because his employer maintained a working environment that was
hostile toward blacks and because he was allegedly discharged for association with the black employees. Lack of standing prevented the plaintiff from
successfully asserting a Title VII claim. The court found that the plaintiff
was not himself "aggrieved" since he alleged discrimination not against
himself but against others. Such a limited interpretation of "aggrievement"
for standing purposes conflicts not only with congressional intent,43 but also
with EEOC decisions which have granted standing to whites under similar
circumstances. 44 It is also a more restrictive standard than has previously
been applied to blacks granted standing under Title VII who were neither
employed by nor directly discriminated against by the employers sued.4 5
The standing requirement as applied to whites should be expanded to the
limits applied by the EEOC and intended by Congress if the McDonald
decision is to be fully implemented by whites under Title VII. Such action
would be consistent with principles announced by the Court in McDonald
46

and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

A fourth major area in which white plaintiffs should be able to assert
Title VII claims under McDonald involves preferential hiring practices
which are part of affirmative action programs. 47 Preferential remedies may
42. 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973); N.O.W. v. Bank of California, 6 FEP
Cases 26, 5 EPD 8510 (N.D. Cal. 1973) involved a white male plaintiff in a similar
situation.
43. Hacket v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971) ("The use in
Title VII of the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' shows a Congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article II of the Constitution"); Air Line Pilots v. Ozark Air Lines, 10 FEP Cases 462, 9 EPD. 10,069 at 7388
(N.D. Ill. 1975) ("[i]n using the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' Congress
intended to extend standing as far as constitutionally permissible").
44. EEOC Decision 71-969,3 FEP Cases 269 at 270, CCH EEOC Dec. 6193 at
4329 (1970) (Of white charging party alleging discrimination against third parties
and maintenance of racially hostile work environment toward blacks, EEOC stated
"[tihat charging party was 'aggrieved' in fact and as a matter of law is well settled").
45. Byrd v. Local 24, I.B.E.W., 375 F. Supp. 545, 556-7 (D. Md. 1974) (Black
plaintiffs were allowed to assert Title VII claims against subcontractors after admitting they had neither been employed by nor applied for employment with the
employers being sued. The court reasoned that the employers relied exclusively on
unions as hiring agents, and the unions discriminated). See also Carroll v. Knowlton
Const. Co., 8 EPD 9526 (S.D. Oh. 1974) (facts and results similar to Byrd).
46. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Trafficante, the Court found that white plaintiffs
had standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to challenge their lessor's practice of
racially discriminating against blacks. The injury alleged by the plaintiffs was loss of
benefit of living in an integrated community, social and professional advantages lost
because of inability to live with minorities, and embarrassment and stigmatization
from living in a "white ghetto." Such arguments are equally applicable to an
employment situation.
47. "Affirmative action" and "preferential remedies" are distinguishable
concepts; the latter is subsumed by the former. "Affirmative action," in a
general sense, includes a number of remedies for employment discriminaPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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be administratively imposed, 48 voluntarily imposed, 49 or judicially mandated. They may arise under the Civil Rights Act of 1870,50 the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 51 Executive Order 11246,52 or under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.5s Title VII is the only provision of the four which
purports to restrict the imposition of preferential remedies,5 4 although in
55
practice this restriction has been completely ineffective for this purpose.
Preferential remedies have been sustained by courts on the basis that these
remedies are constitutionally permissible when imposed to eradicate the
effects of past discrimination. 56 Some courts have declared they were
tion, such as governmental agency prods to get employers to make good
faith efforts to hire or promote more minorities or women. Only the last
cited remedy, i.e., preferential hirings and promotions, positively requiresan
employer to give preferenceto qualified minority persons or women (usually
over white males) when hiring, promoting, or retaining employees in
certain designated job positions.
Edwards & Zaretsky, PreferentialRemedies for Employment Discrimination,74 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1975).

48. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (School board imposing de-selection plan in response to anticipated
budget cut-back).
49. United States v. Wood, Wire, &Sheet Metal Lathers, Local 46,471 F.2d 408
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (court-approved settlement agreement).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport
Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975)
(quotas being imposed at patrolman rank in police department).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Alshuler,
490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V, 1975). See note 2 supra.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) provides:
Nothing contained in Title VII shall be interpreted to require. . . preferential treatment to any individual because of the race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin of such individual. . . on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in any community ....
55. United States v. I.B.E.W., Local 38,428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 943 (1970) ("We believe that section (2000e-2(j)) cannot be construed as a
ban on affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination...").
But see Rios v. Enterpriso Assn. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Hays, J., dissenting) ag ing that this section [§ 2000e-2(j)] has been ignored by
courts in the past. See ge erally, Larson, Remedies for RacialDiscriminationin State and
Local Employment: A Surey andAnalysis, 5 COL. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 335,377 (1973), in

which it was argued tl ere was in fact Congressional approval of preferential
remedies by Congress' lure to adopt an amendment eliminating them. Id. at 377 n.
256.
56. EEOC v. Detrcit Edison, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1 74); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972). Seealso
Bakke v. Regents of Un versity of California, - Cal. 3d -, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976)
(Court held preferential 3dmissions policy unconstitutional, noting that there was no
evidence that it was in posed to remedy past discrimination within the medical
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/10
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required to order such remedies, 57 pointing to the oft-cited passage in
Louisianav. United States,58 "a court has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
59
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future."
Preferential remedies find support in various constitutional arguments,
including the theses that the use of race as a basis for a majority group's
*discrimination infavorof a minority group is not a "suspect" racial classification,60 and that such discrimination is "benign" and therefore not invidious
or stigmatizing. 61 For these reasons, it is argued, the less rigid "rational basis"

test should be applied to sustain the constitutionality of preferential
remedies. 62 The ultimate constitutionality of preferential treatment could
have been resolved by the Supreme Court in DeFunisv. Odegaard63 had the
Court reached the merits of that case. Because no ruling of the Supreme
Court has sustained preferential treatment, the only authority for preferential remedies is that noted earlier which sustained such remedies when they
were imposed to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
It should be possible under McDonaldfor whites to utilize Title VII to
school). But see Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537
(1976) (Court in similar situation sustained constitutionality of preferential admissions policy without any examination of whether it had been imposed to remedy past
discrimination).
57. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1974); Local 53, Heat, Frost &Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).
58. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
59. Id. at 154. See, e.g., United States v. Local 169, Carpenters, 457 F.2d 210,
216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972).
60. Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV.
723, 726-27 (1974). But see Greenawalt, JudicialScrutiny of "Benign"RacialPreferences
in Law School Admissions, 75 COL. L. REV. 559, 572-75 (1975).
61. Edwards & Zaretsky, PreferentialRemedies for EmploymentDiscrimination,74
MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1975). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) where the argument was that minorities were stigmatized by
the thought that they "couldn't make it" without preferential treatment. See also
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 32, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182 (1973) where the
court noted that "the minority admission policy is certainly not benign with respect to
non-minority students who are displaced by it."
62. Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 61, at 14. Contra, Bakke v. Regents of
University of California, - Cal. 3d -, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976) (Court rejected
arguments that rational basis test should be applied to such discrimination, and
instead applied strict scrutiny); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326,
348 N.E.2d 537 (1976) (Court specifically rejected rational basis test and applied level
of scrutiny higher than that required by rational basis test, but lower than that
required by "suspect" classifications).
63. 416 U.S. 312. Of course, a history of past discrimination by the University
of Washington Law School was not even suggested in DeFunis--hence DeFunishad
the effect of posing the preferential remedies question addressed here in a much
broader context. A ruling favorable to the law school in DeFuniswould have provided
a justification much broader than the rationale noted earlier, i.e., to remedy past
discrimination.
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challenge preferential remedies which are not imposed to remedy past
discrimination. 64 More specifically, if a white plaintiff could show that a
preferential remedy was not imposed to remedy the effects of past discrimination, then that remedy would discriminate illegally and should fall. This
situation is illustrated in Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America, Local
2369.65 There the black plaintiffs sought to invalidate their employer's
"last-hired, first-fired" lay-off policy because it allegedly would have perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. The court of appeals reversed
the district court's invalidation of the lay-off plan, holding that to invalidate
the plan would create a preferential remedy in the form of "fictional
seniority" 66 for newly-hired blacks who had not demonstrated that they had
been subjected to unlawful job discrimination. The court determined that
only one of the plaintiffs in the action had been of legal hiring age when the
employer in the suit had ceased its discriminatory hiring practices, and that
none of the plaintiffs had suffered discrimination either when hired or while
working for the employer. Absent effects of past discrimination that would
be perpetuated by the failure to grant the preferential remedy of "fictional
seniority," it would seem that the court rightly refused to grant the requested
remedy.
The court in Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School District67 was faced
with determining the legality of a proposed "de-selection" plan that would
have had the effect of eliminating administrative positions within the school
district because of budget restrictions. White administrators eligible for
"de-selection" challenged the plan because black administrators, otherwise
eligible, were exempted from the plan because of their minority group
status. The court enjoined implementation of the plan, noting that racial
. . .classifications have been allowed by the courts, but only to correct
past discriminatory practices. In the instant case there has been no
showing that the classifications and discriminations to be put into
effect by the defendant school district are to be undertaken to
correct past discrimination. No authority exists to uphold a practice
which discriminates on racial or ethnic lines which is not
being
68
implemented to correct a prior discriminatory situation.
Thus, it might reasonably be argued that whites could successfully challenge
preferential remedies when imposed in the absence of a prior history of
racial discrimination against minorities.
64. The Supreme Court specifically excluded from consideration the validity
of affirmative action programs in its decision in McDonald. 96 S.Ct. at 2578, n.8.
65. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Franksv. Bowman Transp., - U.S.
-, 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976) is not contra; there fictional seniority was awarded to
specific individuals who had been the victims of employment discrimination.
67. 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
68. Id. at 250. See alsoHiatt v. City of Berkely, 10 FEP Cases 251, 9 EPD 9969
(Cal. Super. 1975) (proposed affirmative action program discriminated against
whites; implementation enjoined).
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A second area in which whites could conceivably assert Title VII claims
against preferential remedies is where such remedies-although imposed to
correct prior discrimination-have a direct and substantial discriminatory
impact on non-minorities. Although the successful assertion of such a claim
would be more probable where the imposition of the preference had been
voluntary and without a prior judicial determination of past discriminatory
practices, such claims also might arguably be used to challenge judicially
mandated preferences. Carterv. Gallagher69 exemplified the latter situation.
The district court had ordered the Minneapolis fire department to give
absolute preference in certification as fire fighters to twenty black,
American-Indian, or Spanish-surnamed American applicants. The court of
appeals altered that remedy to provide for a hiring ratio instead of the
absolute preference, noting that the absolute preference ordered by the trial
court would operate as a present infringement on non-minority group
persons. A similar result was reached in Bridgeport Guardiansv. Bridgeport
Civil Service Commission 70 where the district court had ordered that quotas
be used to fill all vacancies occurring after specified dates in the various
ranks within the Bridgeport police department. The court of appeals held
that the imposition of quotas above the entry rank of patrolman constituted
an abuse of discretion and was clearly erroneous, noting that the imposition
of quotas would harshly discriminate against whites because of their color
alone. Hence it appears that whites may, under Title VII, challenge
preferential remedies which have direct and substantial effects on them,
even if those remedies were otherwise validly imposed to remedy past
71
discrimination.
The arguments discussed above also may be utilized in actions brought
under section 1981 ;72 it is not unusual for relief to be sought simultaneously
under both statutes. 73 However, this strategy is not always available because
differences between the statutes may make the use of one either preferable
or mandatory. For example, while Title VII applies only to employers of at
69. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
70. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. See EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Court refused to allow implementation of district court order that would have
removed white union administrator and replaced him with minority member);
United States v. N.L. Ind., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (Court refused to use
absolute hiring preferences and substituted ratios instead); Harper v. Kloster, 486
F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973) (Court ruled lower court properly refused to impose
absolute hiring preferences). See also Cooper, Introduction: Equal Employment Law
Today, 5 COL. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 263, 271 (1973).
72. Courts rely on Title VII principles to resolve issues under section 1981 in an
effort to avoid substantive conflict between the statutes. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 2214
(1976).
73. See, e.g., Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex. 1976); N.O.W.
v. Bank of California, 6 FEP Cases 26, 5 EPD 8510 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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least fifteen employees, 74 section 1981 has no such limitation.7 - Also, while a
person aggrieved under section 1981 may immediately sue for relief,76 suit
under Title VII must first be preceded by resort to administrative action
with the EEOC.77 Finally, availability of relief under the statutes may vary
because of differing statutes of limitations. Section 1981 utilizes the applicable state statute of limitations. 7' Title VII contains its own limitations
periods 79 which requires an initial complaint to be filed with the EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act and permits suit to be filed
within 90 days after the EEOC completes its activities with respect to the
complaint. 80
Where both statutes are equally available to a potential litigant, his
selection may be influenced by the range of relief afforded by each. For
example, punitive damages may be recovered under section 198181 but it is
generally accepted that they are not available under Title VII.8 2 On the
other hand, attorney's fees are not recoverable under section 198183 whereas
Title VII makes specific provision for their recovery. 4 Awards of back pay
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
76. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). After the
Supreme Court determined that section 1982 afforded a remedy against private
discrimination, courts reasoned that the same was true of section 1981. But they
frequently required exhaustion of state administrative remedies and Title VII
remedies before suit was permitted under section 1981. See generally Larson, The
Development of Section 1981 as a Remedyfor RacialDiscriminationin PrivateEmployment,
7 HARV. Civ. LIB. Civ. RTS. L. REV. 56 (1972).
77. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Griffin v.
Pacific Maritim Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973). See
generally Kaemmerer, supra note 3.
78. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johnson
the Court did not consider which Tennessee statute of limitations was applicable.
Courts might differ and apply a statute of limitations applicable for torts, contract
actions, or a state's general statute of limitations. See Larson, supra note 75, at 77.
79. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). 80. Id. See Kaemmerer, supranote 3, for an excellent discussion of the circumstances which vary these limitation periods.

81. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (dictum).
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affirmed, 458 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1972); Tramble v. Converters, Ink Co., 343 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Ill. 1972).

82. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Van Hoomissen
v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Contra, Waters v. Hublein, Inc., 8
FEP Cases 908, 8 EPD 9522 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Dessenberg v. American Metal
Forming Co., 6 FEP Cases 159, 6 EPD 8813 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
83. Runyan v. McCrary, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976). Prior to Alyeska

Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), attorney fees had been
awarded under section 1981; after Alyeska the practice was discontinued by at least
one court. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d
Cir. 1975).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). Such awards may be significant. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971) (award of $150,000).
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may be obtained under either statute, but the maximum length of time for
85
which such an award may be made under Title VII is limited to two years.
Section 1981 contains no such limitation. s6 "Front pay"87 is a remedy
available under Title V11 88 and perhaps section 1981 as well.89 Retroactive
seniority rights have been awarded litigants under Title VII, 90 although
their status under section 1981 is open to question.9' Finally, compensatory
damages for pain, suffering, and humiliation are available under section
1981,92 while it is generally conceded they are not under Title VII.9 3 In view

of the differences between Title VII and section 1981, the choice of remedy
for a potential plaintiff-white or black-will necessarily be a complex one.
The McDonald decision clearly establishes that whites are a class protected by Title VII and section 1981, thus opening the courts to white
plaintiffs who wish to litigate employment discrimination claims. In so
doing, the Court has not only provided a remedy to whites aggrieved by
racial discrimination in employment, 94 but it has also exposed to possible
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
86. An award of back pay has been held to be an equitable remedy, and as such
subject to refusal or limitation by the equitable defense of laches. Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, reh'g denied, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds,- U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976). It has also been held that liability for back
pay under section 1981 is subject to the applicable statute of limitations. See note 78,
supra. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., - F.2d -, 11 EPD 10,728 (4th Cir.
1976).
87. "Front pay simply is an affirmative order designed to compensate the
plaintiff for economic losses that have not occurred as of the date of the court decree,
but that may occur as the plaintiff works toward his or her rightful place." Note, Front
Pay-ProphylacticRelief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAND. L.
REv. 211 (1976). "Rightful place" has reference to the theory of the same name which
courts use to try to put plaintiffs in as good a position as they would have occupied
absent racial discrimination.
88. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., - F.2d -, 11 EPD 10,728 (4th Cir.
1976); United States v. United States Steel Cop., 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala. 1973),
modified on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); White v. Carolina Paperboard Co., 10 EPD 10,470 (W.D. N.C. 1975).
89. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., - F.2d -, 11 EPD 10,728 (4th Cir.
1976), awarded back pay which was, in effect, front pay. Arguably, then, front pay is
available under section 1981. Courts can be expected to analogize from Title VII to
section 1981 when fashioning relief under the latter act. Id. at 7019.
90. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., -

U.S. -,

96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976).

91. Although no authority on this issue has been found, argument by analogy
from Title VII would be possible. See notes 72 & 89, supra.
92. Runyon v. McCrary, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd on othergrounds,U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (1976).
93. Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 10 FEP Cases 730 (D. Utah 1975); Water v.
Hublein, Inc., 8 FEP Cases 908, 8 EPD 9522 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Howard v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Contra, Humphrey v.
Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, Implying Punitive
Damagesin Employment DiscriminationCases,9 HARV. Civ. LIB. CIv. RTS. L. REV. 325
(1974).

94. White plaintiffs, at least in some jurisdictions, were already afforded
remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
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challenge the preferential remedies afforded minorities under affirmative
action programs. 95 The extent to which these remedies will be challenged
successfully is dependent upon the Court's resolution of several important
issues. For example, when are the effects of past discrimination eradicated
by preferential remedies, thus permitting successful challenge of preferential remedies that have served their purpose? Just what is the scope of past
discrimination for the purpose of determining whether a given preferential
remedy has been properly invoked to remedy the purported effects of such
discrimination?9" And when are the effects on third parties of an otherwise
properly imposed preferential remedy so substantial and direct as to invalidate the remedy? These are only some of the questions that await ultimate
resolution by the Supreme Court in this dynamic area of the law.*
JAMES L. MOELLER

315, 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The latter part of the McDonald
decision, dealing with the 1866 Act, resolved any conflicts that might exist in previous
decisions by extending the protection of that act to whites.
95. Such programs were not immune from challenge before; many were
challenged by whites who were threatened by them under FED. R. Civ. P. 24 which
permits intervention. See, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975). However, this remedy was not uniformly available to all
potential plaintiffs, since some plaintiffs became "aggrieved" at a time when intervention might properly be refused as untimely. An independent action then became
necessary. See, e.g., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
96. This issue is illustrated by the dissent in Bakke v. Regents of University of
California, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d 1152,1172 (Tobriner,J., dissenting). Hereit
was argued that the preferential admission program invalidated by the majority was
instituted to remedy "the continuing effect of past discrimination in this country." Id.
at 1180. Such a broad interpretation of "the effects of past discrimination" would
have the effect of upholding virtually any preferential practice. Courts normally look
for the effects of past discrimination only within the institution in which the remedy
under scrutiny has been imposed. See, e.g., cases cited in note 56, supra.
* Since this note was delivered to our printer, the Board of Regents of the
University of California have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari sub nom. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, No. 76-81, 45
U.S.L.W. 3437 (Dec. 14, 1976).
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